For several months now, France has been at the centre of a new kind of digital offensive. This time, there are no tanks or bombs: the weapon being used is disinformation. Cleverly constructed fake news stories, widely shared on social media; cloned websites imitating the national press; doctored videos circulating on Telegram: these are just some of the tools being used to undermine French society.
According to a report published by the Ministry of the Armed Forces in the summer of 2025, the country has suffered six months of intense disinformation campaigns orchestrated by pro-Russian actors. These offensives, conducted from abroad, aim to sow mistrust and weaken national cohesion. Their main objective is to undermine French democracy and sap support for Ukraine.
This information offensive has a name: Storm-1516. Behind this code lies a sophisticated network combining fake accounts, complicit influencers and seemingly credible media outlets. The French report on foreign interference describes a campaign that is increasingly coordinated and technological, capable of adapting its messages to the target audience. The attacks aim to create a climate of mistrust towards institutions, the media and even between citizens.
Between January and June 2025, analysts from the Digital Interference Vigilance and Protection Service, VIGINUM, observed dozens of campaigns of varying scale: fake interviews with French diplomats, doctored videos of elected officials, anonymous publications accusing France of interference in Africa or Ukraine. All could be linked to pro-Kremlin propaganda.
Russia’s strategy is clear: to shift the Ukrainian conflict into the realm of perceptions. By blurring the lines, Moscow seeks to turn every Western society into a psychological battlefield. France, due to its diplomatic and military role in supporting Kyiv, has become a priority target.
These campaigns aim to weaken the legitimacy of the French government, undermine the political consensus around support for Ukraine, and divide public opinion.
The content disseminated is not necessarily extreme. It mixes real facts with invented elements, giving an illusion of authenticity and making it more difficult to refute. Finally, the timing is meticulous: attacks appear on the eve of French political events (elections, parliamentary debates, social crises) to maximise their impact.
In early September, as France prepared to recognise the State of Palestine, yet another disinformation operation is currently targeting the country. A misleading video claims to show pro-Palestinian activists threatening to turn France into an Islamic State. This staging ticks all the boxes of a Russian disinformation campaign called Storm-1516.
Since 2024, another dimension has been added: artificial intelligence. Tools for generating images, sounds and text make it possible to produce falsified content en masse at low cost. Deepfakes showing French politicians in fictional situations have circulated on pro-Russian Telegram channels. AI also facilitates the translation and personalisation of messages. The same content can be reworded differently for a young audience, rural voters or French-speaking communities abroad. Disinformation thus becomes algorithmic, capable of adapting to everyone.
Democracies, committed to truth and freedom of expression, are moving more slowly than propagandists who have no ethical constraints. The adversary is banking on this imbalance.
The challenge for France is to protect its information space without renouncing its democratic principles. This means strengthening citizen resilience rather than imposing restrictions.
JACQUELIN Pierre
(Julien COUTURE, Mathéo ELANA, Lucas VIEIRA, Milo VICARI, Loann TOULC’HOAT)
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